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Abstract
The choice between temporary and permanent migration is today central to the design of migration
policies. We draw a distinction between the two types of migration on the basis of the associated
social cost and the dynamics of learning by migrants. We ﬁnd that unilateral migration policies are
globally ineﬃcient because they lead to too much permanent migration and too little temporary and
overall migration. Existing international agreements on labor mobility, such as the WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services, have failed to do better because they seek primarily to induce host
countries to make commitments to allow entry. Instead, Pareto gains and more liberal migration could
be achieved through multilateral agreements that enable host countries to commit to repatriation.
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dDoes Temporary Migration Have to Be Permanent?
“There is nothing more permanent than temporary migration.”
- Anonymous
“But I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go.”
- Exodus 4:21
Introduction
How can the substantial gains from the international movement of labor be realized
without creating the problems associated with permanent migration? To this diﬃcult policy
q u e s t i o n ,t e m p o r a r ym i g r a t i o ns c h e m e sh a v eo f t e ns e e m e da na n s w e r . B u ts u c hs c h e m e sh a v e
proved extremely diﬃcult to implement. Time and again, the naivety of their basic premise
has been revealed by the permanent presence in host countries of supposedly temporary
foreign workers. Many schemes have been abandoned, while some continue as much narrower
avenues for de facto permanent migration. This paper addresses two questions. Why does
temporary migration not stay temporary? And is there a solution to this problem? Both
questions have received considerable casual but little analytical attention.
1We begin by making a stylized distinction between temporary and permanent migration,
highlighting the sources of divergence between social and private welfare. From the host
country’s point of view, permanent migration is likely to have a higher socio-cultural-political
cost (henceforth, social cost) than temporary migration; but temporary migration entails
other “turnover” costs, particularly for employing ﬁrms, because it deprives them of the
beneﬁts of any investment in training. From the source countries’ perspective, temporary
migration is preferable to permanent since the former alleviates brain-drain and ensures a
greater repatriation of skills (as well as remittances); but given a choice, emigrants are not
inclined to return to their home countries because that implies a lower permanent income.
Beneﬁts from training and losses through brain drain are more relevant to the migration of
the skilled and semi-skilled, on which this paper focuses.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a two-stage game. Migration can occur in one or both stages,
depending on the migration policies of the two countries. Firms in the host country can
choose to train immigrants in the ﬁrst stage. The cost of training is incurred in the ﬁrst
stage and is sunk thereafter, but the beneﬁt from it accrues in the second stage. Depending
upon the nature of social preferences, training technology and the skill level of migrants,
several cases are possible. We focus on three.
The case which is the focus of this paper arises when (a) the host faces intermediate
levels of social cost (from permanent migration) relative to the net beneﬁt from training,
and (b) the source prefers temporary to permanent migration, and either form of migration
to no migration. The resulting non-cooperative Nash equilibrium outcome is permanent
migration, but this is not the ﬁrst-best outcome for either the host or the source. We believe
2that this outcome reﬂects a range of situations involving semi-skilled to skilled workers where
host and source countries ideally want temporary migration only but are unable to implement
it due to a commitment problem. When ﬁrms train immigrants in the ﬁrst stage, they take
into account the impact on their own future proﬁts but not the social cost from permanent
immigration. However, once the immigrants are trained, the training-cost is sunk in nature
so that the host country ﬁnds it desirable to retain them permanently. The time consistent
policy features too much permanent migration and too little temporary migration in each
stage - as has happened with various guest worker schemes put in place by the United States
and European countries. Both countries are worse oﬀ from this relative to the ex ante optimal
policy. We show how a self-enforcing cooperative agreement between the two countries can
reduce the commitment problem leading to global Pareto gains.
The second case arises when condition (b) above is maintained but (a) is relaxed: the
host country faces a social cost that is small relative to the net beneﬁtf r o mt r a i n i n g . T h e
result is permanent migration only; now, however, this is ﬁrst-best for the host but not for
the source. We believe that this outcome reﬂects part of current skilled migration from
developing to industrial countries. For example, countries like Australia and Canada select
permanent migrants through a points system which attaches a high weight to advanced
education. It is also likely that some ostensibly temporary migration schemes, like the
US specialty occupation visas, are intended to be de facto permanent migration schemes
and the temporary phase functions merely as a screening device. In such situations since
the source countries prefer temporary to permanent migration there is a direct conﬂict of
interest between source and host. International cooperation cannot lead to a Pareto superior
3outcome, but could succeed in redistributing global welfare in a more egalitarian way.
The ﬁnal case arises when condition (a) is the same as in the ﬁrst case, but (b) is relaxed:
the costs of brain drain are so high that the source prefers no migration to permanent
migration. The outcome is that the source country limits emigration. While this case
is probably of limited empirical signiﬁcance today, we do see signs of its relevance in the
attempts by various source countries, from the Caribbean to Africa, to somehow restrict the
outﬂow of skilled workers. We show that the level of temporary emigration can be increased
and brain-drain reduced through a self-enforcing cooperative agreement prompting the source
country to relax the emigration constraint. As a consequence, both countries are better oﬀ.
Why do we not observe more international cooperation on labor mobility despite the
potential global beneﬁts suggested above? One reason is that we are not operating in a
two-country world, but in a world where host countries have access to multiple small sources
who cannot easily coordinate policy. Since current migration levels are relatively small, a
host country can simply substitute one source country by another. We show that bilateral
agreements are, therefore, not likely to have a big eﬀect due to their weak enforcement power
-punishment by a single source inﬂicts little pain on the host. To remedy their individual
weakness, source countries must take a coordinated approach by negotiating jointly with the
host countries.
Our results have implications for the design of international cooperation on migration
policies. On the insistence of developing countries, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) and some regional trade agreements have included the “temporary pres-
ence of natural persons” as a mode of trading services. Trade negotiations have, however,
4delivered little additional scope for labor mobility. Countries have been unwilling to commit
to access beyond levels that were already allowed. In contrast, bilateral agreements focusing
on labor alone (e.g. between Spain and Ecuador, Canada and the Caribbean, Germany and
Eastern Europe) have led to somewhat greater access for foreign labor, and this movement
has been genuinely temporary.
We believe that the diﬀering experiences with trade and pure labor agreements is re-
vealing. The former have failed to deliver scope for greater labor mobility because they have
dealt with neither the time inconsistency of migration policy nor the conﬂict of interests
between host and source countries. The focus of these agreements has been on inducing host
countries to commit to greater access when a major problem has been the hosts inability
to commit to returning migrants. Bilateral labor agreements in contrast impose at least an
implicit obligation on the host to repatriate labor. These agreements have thus addressed
to some extent the host’s commitment problem, and succeeded in delivering slightly greater
openness. Their limited impact, however, is attributable to the small size of the source
countries relative to the host and the lack of coordination between source countries.
Existing analytical work on migration policy has focused on the welfare consequences for
host and source countries of allowing free or freer migration (see, for example, Bhagwati, 1991;
Borjas, 1995). The issue of temporariness has been addressed primarily from the individual
migrant’s point of view, with the objective of characterizing the determinants of optimum
duration of stay abroad (Hill 1987; Stark et. al. 1997; Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002).
There is also work on the social costs, learning experience and brain drain associated with
migration (Commander et. al. 2003; Schiﬀ 2000). The present paper builds on this previous
5work to draw a distinction between temporary and permanent migration policy, and shows
how self-enforcing international agreements can improve upon unilaterally optimal policies
of the participating countries.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 1 we describe the basic
setup of the model. In section 2 we derive equilibrium policies when these are set unilaterally.
In section 3 we demonstrate gains from cooperation. A summary of the results and scope
for future work are provided in the conclusion. Some extensions of the model are discussed
in the Appendix.
Section 1: The model
W eb e g i nw i t ham o d e li nw h i c ht h e r ea r et w oc o u n t r i e sc a l l e dh o s t( H) and source
(S). There are two stages, labelled 1 (current stage) and 2 (future stage). These will be
indexed by subscript t =1 ,2. The wage in the host country is exogenously given and ﬁxed
at w, a n da s s u m e dt ob es i g n i ﬁcantly higher than the wage in the source country at all levels
of migration considered here.1 In the absence of any restrictions, any worker in S would
prefer to migrate to H, and to migrate permanently rather than temporarily.
We suppose that H produces two goods, X, Y under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale. We will treat Y as the numeraire good which can be costlessly traded
across countries. Assume that all natives of H, equal to Ly, are employed in sector Y with
each of them producing b>0 units of the good. Good X is assumed to be a non-traded
1 This is a standard assumption in the literature and typically attributed to diﬀerences between the two
countries in technology or complementary inputs.
6good, produced by using domestically supplied capital, K, and skilled labor which is supplied
entirely by S.2 Without loss of generality we set K =1 .
The two-stage game
The structure of the game in the absence of cooperation between the two countries is
as follows. At the beginning of stage 1 the government of the host country (henceforth,
government) invites M1 number of immigrants and assigns them across ﬁrms in sector X.
The value of M1 is endogenously determined in the model. We assume that there are a
large number of symmetric ﬁrms behaving as price and wage takers. Capital is freely mobile
across ﬁrms at all times and there is a perfectly competitive capital market.
Next each ﬁrm decides how much output to produce in stage 1 and how much capital
and labor to hire subject to the quota of immigrants assigned to it. It also simultaneously
decides how many immigrants to train, which involves imparting ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g et o
them. Available evidence broadly supports the importance of training by ﬁrms of employees,
including immigrants. For example, a survey of 1,145 senior level managers and labor leaders
in Canada revealed that “upgrading the skills of current employees” was the most important
action they would take in addressing skill requirements of their respective organizations in the
near future (CLBC, 2002, page 1). Data from the 1998-99 Workplace and Employee Survey
for Canada also shows that employer participation in training new immigrants is signiﬁcant:
about 48% of all recent immigrants obtained employer sponsored training. The incidence of
training is much higher for permanent relative to temporary immigrant workers (49.2 versus
2 It is not important to our results that sector X employs immigrants alone and Y employs natives alone.
However, the assumption helps to simplify the algebra and draw sharp results.
731.7 percent). The incidence is also signiﬁcantly greater for more highly educated workers,
and for professionals relative to technical and clerical staﬀ.
Table 1: Employer sponsored training in 1998-99
Immigrant category % of recent immigrants in the % of Canadian-born in the
category receiving training category receiving training
All 47.7 56.3
With no post-secondary education 34.5 50.6
With post-secondary education 55.4 61.9
Non-permanent workers 31.7 43.2




Source: Workplace and Employee Survey, 1998-99. Sample size: 23,540.
For simplicity, the costs and beneﬁts from training are assumed to have the following
structure. Let c>0 denote the exogenously given and constant cost of training each
immigrant, which is incurred in stage 1. Training involves imparting ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
to a worker while currently employed (on the job training). Without loss of generality we
assume that the eﬃciency unit of each immigrant in stage 1 equals unity. Let γ > 1 denote
the eﬃciency unit of a trained worker in stage 2 to his stage 1 employer.3 Let MT denote the
3 There is little formal work on employer sponsored training of immigrants. However, there is some evi-
dence on training in general which is broadly consistent with the structure of the model. For example, Cohen
a n dE c k s t e i n( 2 0 0 2 )ﬁnd that training of immigrants in Israel had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on their productivity
8immigrants who undergo training. Mu ≡ M1 − MT is the number of untrained immigrants
available at the end of the ﬁrst stage.
Now the second stage begins. In this stage the government decides how many new
immigrants to invite from S and how many trained and untrained immigrants to retain from
stage 1. Let these levels be denoted by m2,M∗
T and M∗
u, respectively. At the same time the
government decides how to allocate them across ﬁrms. We assume that the eﬃciency unit
of each new immigrant equals unity. Firms decide how much to produce, how much capital
and labor to hire subject to the the number of immigrants assigned to it. Production occurs
and consumption is realized for the second stage, and the game ends.
Before solving the equilibria of the game we need to outline the production technology,
the utility function and the social cost. These are as follows.
Production and welfare in the host country
Let Nt denote the total eﬃciency units of migrants in stage t. We have that N1 = M1
and N2 = m2 + M∗
u + γM∗
T. Throughout we will maintain that M∗
T ≤ MT and M∗
u ≤ Mu.
Aggregate production of X is given by: Xt = X(K,Nt)=K0.5N0.5
t .4
Let Wt denote the welfare of all the natives of H. This depends on the utility from the
consumption of the two goods net of the social cost of immigration. We assume that the
former is given by a quasi-linear function, which after normalizing the total natives of H to
and wage rate. However, the gains in the immediate future after training were very modest and there was a
lag before the gains were realized.
4 Note that the aggregate production of X is independent of the size-structure of ﬁrms. This is simple to
see for stage 1 given that all ﬁrms are symmetric, production is subject to constant returns to scale and that
capital is perfectly mobile across ﬁrms. For this property to hold in stage 2 as well we merely need to ensure
that trained immigrants who are retained are not arbitrarily assigned across ﬁrms since their productivity is
higher when assigned to their stage-1 employer. It will be clear from the solution below that a trained migrant
if retained will always be assigned to his stage-1 employer. With this allocation so determined, aggregate
output can be expressed simply as a function of K and N2 as above.





t ) is the aggregate consumption of
X(Y ) in stage t and α > 0 is an exogenously given parameter of the model. We assume that
immigrants while in H consume (or remit) good Y only. The motivation for this is that
typically immigrants are concentrated in a few sectors while their consumption is spread out
over a large variety of goods. Thus, they consume an insigniﬁcant proportion of the good
they themselves produce. The motivation for the social cost and its structure is as follows.
Social cost of immigration
In the context of this paper, social cost includes any negative eﬀect on the natives of
the host country from immigration which is not taken into account by the host ﬁrms or
the migrants. There is a growing body of literature identifying the nature of these costs
which can take a myriad of forms and vary across countries. For example, in some cases
immigrants and natives diﬀer signiﬁcantly in language, customs, values and culture so that
the former adversely aﬀect the survival of local cultures and life-styles (Bliss, 1994, Schiﬀ,
1992).5 The existence of racial prejudice and xenophobia also implies that natives suﬀer
from increased immigration. For example the International Social Survey Program (1995)
reveals that the percentage of respondents who believe immigration is bad ranged from 43%
in Canada to 85 % in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Some costs may be
more economic in nature. For example, it is often argued that immigrants make demands
upon public services without contributing as much to the public exchequer as natives.6
Also, new immigrants may displace natives from certain sectors or regions which can lead
5 See, for example, Putnam (1995), Carlton (1995), Coleman (1987, 1988, 1990), Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Schiﬀ (1992).
6 This concern is less relevant for immigration of skilled workers which is the focus of this study. For more
details on this point see, for example, Lee and Miller 2000, Auerbach and Oreopolis 2000, Storesletten 2000
and Borjas 1999.
10to higher unemployment amongst natives or adjustment costs borne either by the natives
directly or by their government. For example, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1998) show
that an increase in the immigrant share by 1% point increased unemployment duration of
Austrian manufacturing workers by about 5%. This increase was most pronounced for young
workers. Hatton and Tani (2003) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant geographical displacement of natives from
immigration in the UK.7
The important point in the context of this paper is not the mere existence of such nega-
tive externalities, but how these vary between temporary and permanent migrants. There is
no formal work in this area but available evidence suggests that permanent migrants impose
larger social costs than temporary ones. For example, in a study based on a sample of 781
Batswana (citizens of Botswana), Campbell (2003) reports that owing to considerable social
aversion towards immigrants, short and speciﬁc-term residence are preferred over permanent
residence by immigrants. Winters et. al. (2002) also suggest that the temporary movement
of unskilled workers poses fewer cultural or integration threats and makes less demand upon
public services than permanent migration. One reason is that temporary workers are less
likely to be accompanied by their families, including children who utilize the school system,
and less likely to impose old-age related net costs on the host society.
Based on this evidence, the social cost takes the following form in our model. Measured
in terms of the total loss in utility of all the natives of H, t h es o c i a lc o s to fe a c hp e r m a n e n t
migrant in stage 2 is equal to Sp > 0. Without much loss of generality we set the social cost
7 The impact of immigration on unemployment of natives is likely to be more signiﬁcant in those cases
where the labor market is less ﬂexible as, for example, shown by Angrist and Kugler, 2002 in their study of
EU countries. When labor markets are ﬂexible, natives may experience some decline in the wage rate from
immigration. The evidence on the size of this eﬀect is mixed. See, for example, Borjas, 2003.
11of a temporary migrant to zero. 8 Let SCt denote the total social cost in stage t. We have
that SC1 =0and SC2 =( M∗
T + M∗
u)Sp.
Aggregate welfare is given by: Wt = CSt +PSt −SCt where CSt(PSt) is the aggregate
consumer (producer) surplus from X in stage t. There is no immigration tax or migration
related quota-rent in our model. Computing we get: W2 = u(X2) − w(M∗
T + M∗
u + m2) −
(M∗
T + M∗
u)Sp and W1 = u(X1) − wM1 − cMT. Lastly, assume that there is no discounting
so that, ex ante, national welfare of H equals W1 + W2 ≡ Ω.
Section 2: Solution to the two-stage game
The decision on whether to train migrants will play a central role in our model. This
decision depends on how the quota is allocated across ﬁr m si nt h et w os t a g e s ,a n do nh o w
ﬁrms form expectations about future policy. We assume that the allocation of quota is
symmetric across all ﬁr m si ne a c hs t a g ea n dt h a ti fs o m eﬁrms do not wish to utilize their
quota fully then the surplus is equally distributed across the remaining ﬁrms.9 Regarding
the structure of expectations, we impose three plausible restrictions: (i) each ﬁrm treats the
training decision of the remaining ﬁr m sa sg i v e na n di n d e p e n d e n to fi t so w na c t i o n ;( i i )e a c h
ﬁrm correctly anticipates that the outcome in stage 2 is given by the solution outlined below;
(iii) each ﬁrm correctly anticipates that the allocation of migrants across ﬁrms in stage 2 is
determined by the symmetric quota rule stated above.10
8 It is assumed here that temporary and permanent migrants diﬀer in their social cost in stage 2 but not
in stage 1. Our results are unaﬀected if permanent migrants imposed a higher cost in stage 1 as well.
9 By default, if some migrants are left in the end then they are returned to the source country.
10 Relaxing the assumption of symmetric allocation of quotas and of non-naive expectations does not change
our results qualitatively. For more details on this point see Appendix C.
12It is straightforward to see that irrespective of the parameter values, the government will
never retain any untrained immigrant. The reason for this is that, viewed at the beginning
of stage 2, if an untrained immigrant is replaced by a new one then total output and wage bill
will remain unchanged but the total social cost will decrease by Sp. This will increase W2 by
t h es a m ea m o u n t . T h u s ,w eh a v et h a ti na n yt i m ec o n s i s t e n ts o l u t i o nM∗
u =0 . The solution
to the remaining endogenous variables admits a large range of possibilities depending on
the parameter values. For tractability we distinguish between two sets of parameter values
depending on whether the following condition holds or not
Sp <w (γ − 1) ....... C1
Interpretation of C1 is simple. Viewed at the beginning of stage 2, if a trained immigrant
is replaced by γ new immigrants then W2 will rise by Sp on account of lower social cost but
it will fall by w(γ − 1) due to a higher wage bill. There is no other eﬀect on W2 since the
proposed substitution leaves X2 unchanged. In other words, since the wage rate is ﬁxed at
w, workers with higher productivity increase producer surplus and hence W2 due to a lower
eﬀective wage. This eﬀect is likely to arise in more general settings than ours provided that
ﬁrms are able to capture some rent from ﬁrm-speciﬁct r a i n i n g . C1 states that, ex post,
the beneﬁtf r o ml o w e re ﬀective wage dominates the higher social cost of retaining trained
immigrants.
In the rest of this section, we derive the solution from the host country’s point of view
and assume that the source country does not intervene in the migration process.11
11 In section 3 we discuss the implications of an active source country for our results.
132.1 When C1 does not hold
In this case the ex post optimal policy of the host country is to return all stage 1
immigrants. Firms correctly anticipates this and hence no training occurs. Further, in
this case Sp >w (η − 1) implying that the government will always prefer new immigrants to
untrained ones. Consequently, the full time consistent solution features temporary migration
only with M1 = m2 = α2/4(w +1 ) 2 ≡ ˆ m2 and MT = M∗
T = M∗
u =0 .
2.2 When C1 holds
First consider the solution to the second stage of the game. Let M∗tc
T (mtc
2 ) denote the
solution values of M∗
T(m2). We have
M∗tc






T = γα2/4(w +Sp + γ)2
mtc
2 =m a x






Intuitively, when C1 holds the government prefers, ex post, to retain trained immigrants over
others and hence begins by hiring them ﬁrst. The marginal beneﬁt and cost is equalized
when ˆ M∗
T number of them are hired. This constitutes an upper limit to the value of M∗tc
T
. Noting that M∗
T ≤ MT we get M∗tc
T v a l u ea ss h o w na b o v e . F r o mt h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rW2
it is simple to see that trained and new immigrants are substitutes of each other and for
each trained migrant retained, the government ﬁnds it optimal to lower new immigrants by
γ. This explains the solution for mtc
2 .
Summarizing: Viewed ex post, permanent migrants impose a higher social cost but the
host beneﬁts on account of the training-rent extracted from them. The relative strength of
these two factors determines their overall desirability compared to temporary migrants.
14Now consider the solution to the ﬁrst stage of the game when C1 holds. In this stage the
government decides how many immigrants to invite and ﬁrms decide how many to train. For
any individual ﬁrm, the training decision is based on the training cost, c, and the expected
future beneﬁt. Suppose that c is not too large so that some training is privately proﬁtable,
for which a suﬃcient condition is:12
c<S p ....... C2
Given C1,condition C2 ensures that the equilibrium value of MT is strictly positive.13
When C1 and C2 hold and the source country is inactive then the unique time consistent
solution features ﬁrms behaving symmetrically and:
M∗tc
T =m i n {M1, ˆ M∗
T}
M1 > 0,M T = M∗tc
T ,M ∗
u =0 ,m 2 = mtc
2
The solution states that M1 is strictly positive. This follows directly from the fact that the
value of the marginal product of labor in X approaches positive inﬁnity as M1 approaches
zero and the marginal social cost of immigrants is ﬁnite (bounded above by 2w + c + Sp).
The interpretation for M∗
u,m 2 values is as discussed above. The solution for M∗tc
T implies
that it is either constrained by the available pool of potential trainees (= M1)o ri te q u a l st h e
maximum number of trained migrants that the government will retain in stage 2 (= ˆ M∗
T).
The interpretation is simple. Suppose ﬁrst that M1 is non-binding so that M∗tc
T = ˆ M∗
T.
12 If c is too large, then there will be no training in equilibrium. The solution then is exactly as in Section
2.1.
13 C2 is not a necessary condition for MT > 0. This holds under weaker conditions too. However, under
weaker conditions the equilibrium may not be stable without further restrictions. C1 − C2 ensure that the
time consistent solution exists, is unique and globally stable.
15Since ﬁrms behave symmetrically, each ﬁrm trains ˆ M∗
T/n migrants. No ﬁrm can do better
by training an extra migrant because under the quota rule and the structure of expectations,
it realizes it will not get to retain any more workers in the future. We need to check if it can
do better by reducing the level of training. The marginal cost to the ﬁrm of training and
subsequently hiring an extra migrant is c+w and the marginal beneﬁte q u a l sP2∂X2/∂MT.
It can be easily checked that at the proposed solution the latter equals Sp + w. Note that
under C2 the marginal beneﬁt is higher than the marginal cost so that a small downward
revision in the level of training is not optimal for the ﬁrm. It is simple to see that this holds
for ﬁnite downward revisions also because P2∂X2/∂MT can only increase as MT falls below
ˆ M∗
T while the marginal cost is constant.14 Now suppose that M1 ≤ ˆ M∗
T so that our solution
implies that M∗tc
T = M1. The intuition for this result can be seen by following exactly the
s a m es t e p sa sf o rt h ec a s ew i t hM1 > ˆ M∗
T and noting that P2∂X2/∂MT is non-increasing in
MT with m2 adjusted appropriately to equal mtc
2 .
Summarizing: We have derived the time consistent solution when the source country is
inactive. When the social cost is high relative to the beneﬁt from training, the equilibrium
features temporary migration only. However, when the social cost is below a critical level
relative to the training-beneﬁt, there is some permanent migration in equilibrium.
14 When a single ﬁrm reduces the number of migrants it trains then it will expect MT to fall since it treats
the training levels of other ﬁr m sa sg i v e n .F r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of N2 and the structure of m
tc
2 it can be easily
seen that this can never increase the value of N2 w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tP2∂X2/∂MT cannot fall.
16Section 3: International agreements
In this section, we analyze the eﬃciency of the solution derived above and establish the
scope for international agreements.
3.1 T h es o u r c ec o u n t r y
So far we have approached the issue of migration policy from the host country’s point
of view. Consider now the welfare of the source country and the instruments available to
it. Given our assumptions, the migrant is better oﬀ in the host country, and would prefer
permanent to temporary migration.15 The impact on the source country’s welfare from
emigration of skilled and semi-skilled workers is less clear and is at the heart of the “brain
drain” literature. Table 2 provides some evidence on the size of brain drain.16 While
the literature on brain drain focuses on the net beneﬁts to the source country from the
emigration of its skilled workers, our interest is in the relative beneﬁts of permanent and
temporary migration.
15 In richer models migrants may prefer to move back to their original country after working for a few years
abroad due to utility from consumption in their own country. This does not aﬀect the qualitative nature of
our results except in the extreme case where migrants prefer to return so soon that the problems associated
with permanent (long term) migration do not arise at all.
16 The loss of skilled workers due to brain drain is likely to be higher than suggested by the table when we
account for the fact that skilled emigrants are not only the highly educated ones but also the most able and
qualiﬁed amongst the educated ones.
17Table 2: Tertiary Educated Population in OECD Countries

















Source: Tertiary educated population in OECD from Dumontand Lemaitre (2004), Tertiary educated
population in countries of birth from Barro and Lee (1993) and its update at www.ksg.harvard.edu/CID
17 The table was presented by Robert Lucas at a seminar on migration organized by the The World Bank,
Washington DC.
18It seems reasonable to assume that for a wide variety of situations, the source country
is better oﬀ with temporary migration (Commander et al. 2003). Temporary migration
alleviates the costs of brain drain, and is likely to be associated with a higher repatriation
of incomes than permanent migration.18 Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that return-
migrants bring back with them valuable skills acquired abroad which enhance productivity in
the source country. For example, there is evidence that a group of skilled blue-collar workers
from Moldova who worked in companies in Slovenia for six months acquired industrial and
technical skills on par with their Slovene counterparts which they brought back to their home
country (Ellerman, 2003).19
Our model can be easily extended to include such beneﬁts to the source country. For
instance, we can assume that in addition to the ﬁrm speciﬁc training immigrants acquire skills
also through learning-by-doing which can be easily transferred across ﬁrms and countries.
The qualitative nature of all our results will be virtually unchanged by this extension. The
signiﬁcance of these beneﬁts and costs also determines the relative ranking at the margin
of permanent and no migration. When such costs are small (large), permanent migration
would (would not) be preferred to no migration.
We will ﬁrst assume the following preference structure: the source country prefers
temporary migration to permanent migration to no migration. Later we shall also explore
the implications of alternative preference structures. We now proceed to analyze the scope
for international agreements.
18 We are abstracting from the larger beneﬁts that may come from permanent migration due to the greater
scope it oﬀers for cumulative saving and learning.
19 There is also substantial evidence in the literature on growth theory that learning-by-doing is important
in human capital accumulation.
193.2 No gains from cooperation
First consider the case when C1 does not hold. In the previous section we showed
that in this case the time consistent policy features “temporary migration only” and “no
training”. Now consider the ex ante optimal policy which the government will choose if it
could credibly commit to future policy at the beginning of stage 1. Since C1 does not hold,
it follows that c+Sp >w (γ−1). Interpretation of this inequality is simple. Viewed ex ante,
if a trained immigrants is replaced by γ new ones in stage 2 then overall welfare (W1 + W2)
will increase by c+Sp due to lower training and social cost. However, welfare will decrease
by w(γ − 1) due to a higher wage bill. The ex ante optimal policy will feature “temporary
migration only” if and only if the previous inequality holds. Thus, in this case the ex ante
optimal policy involves the government inviting ˆ m2 number of immigrants in each stage with
no permanent migration and no training which is exactly the same as the time consistent
solution. It is simple to see now that there are no Pareto gains from cooperation here.
That is, any movement in w or migration level will make at least one country worse oﬀ,a n d
any move from temporary to permanent migration will make both the countries worse oﬀ.
In terms of the real world, this situation applies to much of unskilled migration. At the
low-skill end there is little scope for training and the net beneﬁt from training, if any, is very
small. The previous inequality is almost guaranteed to hold then.
Summarizing: Host countries with high social cost can implement their ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yo f
“temporary migration only”. This is the ﬁrst best policy for source also. Thus, there are
no Pareto gains from cooperation.20
20 We note here that when the both countries have active migration policies, multiple equilibria may arise.
203.3 Gains from cooperation
Now consider the case when C1 holds. To analyze the gains from cooperation we put
forward the following condition
c +Sp >w (γ − 1) ...... C3
As discussed above, C3 implies that the ex ante optimal policy of the host country is tem-
porary migration only at level ˆ m2 in each stage.
Suppose that C3 holds along with C1,C2. As discussed in the introduction, this situ-
ation is most likely for host countries with intermediate levels of social cost and for skilled
and semi-skilled immigrants. In this situation, both countries prefer a policy of temporary
migration only (implied by C3) b u tt h i si sn o tt i m ec o n s i s t e n t( b yC1,C2). Given its pref-
erence structure, the source country cannot beneﬁcially intervene unilaterally. In addition
to this globally sub-optimal structure of migration, another potential ineﬃciency relates to
the equilibrium value of M1. To see this, consider how the host country acting unilaterally
chooses M1. Starting from zero, as M1 rises there are two competing eﬀects on overall wel-
fare. Since M∗tc
T rises with M1 this will lower overall welfare with C3 in place. At the
same time X1 will rise along with the total wage bill. From the deﬁnition of ˆ m2 it follows
that, neglecting the change in MT,W 1 will increase with M1 over the interval (0, ˆ m2) and
decrease thereafter. Thus, overall welfare is strictly decreasing in M1 for ∀M1 ≥ ˆ m2 but
this relationship is ambiguous otherwise. It follows immediately from this that the solution
value of M1 will never be strictly greater than ˆ m2.
For example, a complete ban on migration by both the countries in each stage is a (weak) subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of the game. Gains from cooperation may then arise in jointly moving from this autarky state
to one involving some migration. These are "pure coordination" gains from cooperation and we rule them out
from our analysis throughout the paper in order to focus on other motivation for cooperation. This makes it
only more diﬃcult for us to establish the need for international agreements.
21The key question then is if lowering M1 below ˆ m2 is desirable for the host country.
For this note that with MT held ﬁxed momentarily, W1 achieves its maxima at M1 =ˆ m2.
Thus, a small reduction in M1 from ˆ m2 has a second order eﬀect on W1. Further, if MT
falls too then this will increase overall welfare through a ﬁrst order eﬀect. However the
inﬁnitesimal change may or may not reduce the value of MT. For example, if ˆ M∗
T < ˆ m2
then not all stage 1 immigrants will be trained so that lowering M1 by a small amount will
leave MT unchanged. Of course, large reductions in M1 ( t oal e v e lb e l o w ˆ M∗
T) will lower
MT but without further restrictions on parameter values it is impossible to see whether such
a ﬁnite change will increase overall welfare of the host country (because W1 decreases and
W2 increases). To resolve this problem we impose a simple condition typically observed
in the real world that temporary and permanent migration coexist. That is, mtc
2 > 0 and
M∗tc
T > 0. The latter inequality is guaranteed by C1 and C2. The necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for mtc
2 > 0 to hold are, respectively, 1+γw>(1 + w)γ0.5 (condition C4) and
ˆ M∗
T ≥ ˆ m2 (condition C5).
Putting these results together we have that under C1−C5, the time consistent solution
features: M∗tc
T ,M T,m tc
2 > 0; M∗
u =0and 0 <M 1 < ˆ m2. T h ee xa n t eo p t i m a lp o l i c y
involves M1 = m2 =ˆ m2 and no permanent migration and no training.21
Summarizing: The inability to commit to temporary migration policy leads to smaller
migration ﬂows in the ﬁrst stage. Further, in the second stage it leads to too much permanent
migration and too little temporary migration.
Now consider how a bilateral agreement can improve upon this outcome by enabling
21 It can be checked that conditions C1 − C5 are all simultaneously satisﬁed under a range of parameter
values.
22the host country to credibly commit to sending back a larger number of stage-1 immigrants.
To this end, note that in the equilibria derived above, mtc
2 > 0. This will play a useful role
here. At the beginning of stage 1, the two countries sign a bilateral agreement specifying
the following strategy: M1 = Mtc
1 + ε1,M ∗
T = M∗tc
T − εT where ε1, εT are some strictly
positive numbers, m2 = mtc
2 + γεT and M∗
T = Mtc
T − εT ≥ 0 and, if any country deviates
from this then both the countries ban any further migration completely.22
In simple words, the proposed strategy implies a smaller number of permanent (trained)
migrants and a larger ﬂow of temporary migrants in both the stages relative to the outcome
when policies are set unilaterally. Further, the cooperative eﬀort requires that if any country
deviates then there is no ﬂow of new migrants thereafter. For this to be implementable and
welfare enhancing we need to show that: (i) the proposed strategy is sub-game perfect (time
consistent) in that no country has an incentive to deviate unilaterally at any stage, and (ii)
welfare of each country is higher under this strategy than with policies set unilaterally. Part
(ii) is simple and is discussed in detail in Appendix A. Part (i) can be shown as follows.
If a deviation occurs then both countries ban migration. This is time consistent since
no country can do better by unilaterally deviating given the other country imposes the
ban. This is the usual autarky-threat utilized in repeated games to sustain cooperation
in a self-enforcing manner. Now consider the case when there is no deviation. To solve
backwards assume that countries cooperate in stage 1 as required so that M1 = Mtc
1 + ε1.
If the host country sets M∗
T as required by the cooperative strategy then it will have no
22 One potential problem with implementing a ban on migration is the possibility of illegal migration.
However, as mentioned above, the case being considered relates to skilled and semi-skilled workers. It is
unlikely that a migration scheme for such workers can be operated clandestinely against the wishes of the
source country.
23i n c e n t i v et oc h o o s eav a l u eo fm2 other than the proposed one since this is ex-post optimal
given M∗
T = M∗tc
T − εT. Hence consider its incentive to deviate from the value of M∗
T. The
incentive to deviate will be maximum when all the M1 migrants are trained in stage 1 and
H ﬁnds it optimal (with respect to W2) to retain all of them . In this case a deviation
implies that H will have ε1 + εT more trained migrants than under cooperation (note that
Mtc
1 = M∗tc
T as shown above). The punishment involves loosing mtc
2 + γεT number of new
migrants in stage 2. Thus, in the worst possible scenario for sustaining cooperation, the
simple trade-oﬀ is ε1 + εT trained migrants versus mtc
2 + γεT new migrants. Now allow
ε1,εT to be arbitrarily small but strictly positive. It is evident that for these arbitrary
small values the beneﬁt from deviation will be arbitrarily small but the cost will be strictly
positive since this involves loosing at least mtc
2 number of new migrants which, as shown
above, is strictly positive and independent of ε1 and εT. Thus, even if all stage-1 migrants
were trained, the host country will not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to deviate in the second stage for
suﬃciently small values of ε1,εT. The source country has no incentive to deviate from the
proposed strategy in stage 2 because it only stands to loose by moving to the no-migration
outcome in stage 2. Now follow the same logic again to see that no country will want to
deviate for suﬃciently small values of ε1 + εT. We conclude from this that the proposed
cooperative eﬀort is sub-game perfect and no country will want to deviate from cooperating
in each stage for suﬃciently small values of ε1 and εT.
Summarizing: Both countries prefer temporary migration only. Absent cooperation, the
host country ﬁnds it too costly to achieve this outcome as it involves restricting all immigra-
tion in stage 1. The source also faces the same problem Cooperation makes it more costly
24for the host to retain migrants and permanent migration falls. This happens without either
country having to reduce migration ﬂows in stage 1. Cooperation is migration-liberalizing
and promotes temporary over permanent migration.
We assumed above that, absent cooperation, the source country is inactive. One simple
rationale for this is that the source country prefers permanent migration to no migration
(assumed above). Consider the alternative scenario when the source prefers no migration
to permanent migration. Under the conditions stated above we have already shown that all
stage-1 migrants would be retained permanently by the host country. Given this expected
behavior of the host country, the unilaterally optimal policy of the source country is to ban
all migration in stage 1. Clearly, there are potential Pareto gains from cooperation: if
the host can be forced to return stage-1 immigrants (some or all) then the source will relax
the ban on migration which will increase the welfare of both the countries. That such an
agreement can be sustained in a self-enforcing way is also easy to establish, as discussed in
more detail in the next sub-section. We can summarize our results here by noting that
irrespective of the preference structure of the source country, there are Pareto gains from
cooperation when the host country faces a commitment problem.
3.3.2 Case B: When C3 does not hold
Maintain C1,C2 and suppose that C3 does not hold. This case is diﬀerent from Case
A in that the ex ante optimal policy features some permanent migration of trained workers.
This allows for the possibility that the commitment problem shown above may not arise
here. We will focus on this case ﬁrst since it is in sharp contrast to Case A.23 To this
23 It is possible that even with C4 violated the commitment problem may still remain. The structure of
gains from cooperation is then similar to the one discussed above in Case A.
25end, we impose an additional restriction that 2(w +1) 2 > (w +γ +Sp +c)2 (condition C7).
The structure of the equilibrium derived in section 2 applies here also. However, the key
diﬀerence is in the equilibrium value of M1. For Case A we argued that host has an incentive
to reduce immigration in stage 1 to limit training and permanent migration in the second
stage. This logic does not apply here since, with C3 violated, some permanent migration
of trained workers is ex ante optimal. It can be easily checked that with C3 violated and
C1,C2,C7 h o l d i n g ,t h ee xa n t eo p t i m a lp o l i c yo ft h eh o s ti m p l i e sM1 > ˆ m2. That is, ex
ante, the gain from permanent trained immigrants is suﬃciently large that the government
invites more than ˆ m2 number of immigrants in stage 1 with the sole intention of training
and retaining them for future beneﬁt. The time consistent equilibrium solution is trivial
now. The government simply implements M1 e x a c t l ya tt h es a m el e v e la si m p l i e db yt h e
ex ante optimal policy. Further from the solution for mtc
2 outlined in section 2.2 it is clear
that this will be equal to zero. It is straightforward to note from this that the full ex ante
optimal policy is then time consistent too. Clearly, since the host implements its ﬁrst best
policy and the source is inactive there are not Pareto gains from cooperation. In fact, the
host will be strictly worse oﬀ from any move to a diﬀerent outcome.
However, gains from cooperation can still arise once we take into account the response
of the source country which in turn depends on its preference structure. First consider the
preference structure assumed above when the source country prefers temporary migration
to permanent migration to no migration. As discussed in the previous paragraph, absent
cooperation and an inactive source, the host country implements permanent migration only
and the time consistent policy is ex ante optimal too. Allow the source country to be active
26now. Since it prefers permanent to no migration, its optimal policy (absent cooperation and
given the strategy of the host country) is to do nothing. Of course, the source will be strictly
better oﬀ with a shift from permanent to temporary migration but it cannot implement this
unilaterally. It is also clear from this there are no potential Pareto gains from cooperation.
Simply put, the host will be worse oﬀ from any shift towards temporary migration or change
in overall migration levels from the non-cooperative time consistent solution. We summarize
this ﬁnding below.
Summarizing: When the host prefers permanent migration to temporary migration and the
source prefers temporary to permanent to no migration there is a conﬂict of interest between
the two countries. Cooperative agreements can only strive to alter the distribution of welfare
across countries but this will make the host country worse oﬀ.
Continuing, consider now the remaining case when the source prefers temporary to no
migration to permanent migration. Since any positive level of emigration will be permanent,
source bans all migration in the ﬁrst stage as it prefers no migration to permanent migration.
The resulting equilibrium will feature migration in stage 2 at level ˆ m2 and M1 =0 . Pareto
gains from cooperation are now evident. Both countries can be better oﬀ if they can
implement a strictly positive level of temporary migration in the ﬁrst stage.24 The only
question that remains is whether such an agreement will be self-enforcing. To this end,
consider the following strategy when the two countries cooperate. Let M1 = ν1, and
m2 =ˆ m2 if all the ν1 migrants are returned after stage 1 and m2 =0otherwise. Following
the same logic as discussed above under Case A, it is simple to see that the strategy is
24 It may or may not involve some permanent migration also.
27subgame perfect and all the ν1 migrants will be returned when ν1 is suﬃciently small. Both
the countries will be better oﬀ relative to the non-cooperative outcome: S increases the ﬂow
of temporary migrants while H gets some workers in stage 1. The resulting equilibrium
will feature temporary migration only in stage 2 at level ˆ m2 and M1 =0 . We consider the
following coordination. Let M1 = ν1, and m2 =ˆ m2 if all the ν1 migrants are returned
after stage 1 and m2 =0otherwise. Following the same logic as discussed above under
Case A, it is simple to see that the strategy is subgame perfect and all the ν1 migrants
will be returned when ν1 is suﬃciently small. Both the countries will be better oﬀ relative
to the non-cooperative outcome: S increases the ﬂow of temporary migrants while H gets
some workers in stage 1. Of course, other Pareto improving and self enforcing agreements
also exist. Now repeat the argument when the source country does not completely ban all
emigration in stage 1 but limits to suﬃciently so that M1 = MT < ˆ m2/γ and, consequently,
m2 > 0. A Pareto improving and self enforcing cooperative outcome can be easily sustained:
set M1 =ˆ m2/γ +ν1 and m2 t h es a m ea si nt h en o n - c o o p e r a t i v eo u t c o m ei ft h eh o s tc o u n t r y
returns ν1 number of migrants; if it fails to do so then set m2 =0 .
Summarizing: When the source country prefers no migration to permanent migration and
the host prefers permanent over temporary migration then the fear of brain-drain prompts the
source country to ban migration. A cooperative agreement can reduce brain drain by enforcing
return-migration. This is migration-liberalizing and generates Pareto gains globally.
An overview of the results in this section is presented in the following table:
28Host
T P N P T N
Source T P N Pareto gains Distributional gains only
T N P Pareto gains Pareto gains
T: Temporary migration, P: Permanent migration, N: No migration,  : is strictly better than
3.4 Multilateralism
One objection to our results is that it deals with the potential beneﬁts from labor
agreements without explaining why eﬀorts have not already been made to realize these ben-
eﬁts in the real world. We believe that a major problem is the existence of not one but
multiple source countries which have failed coordinate their actions through a multilateral
agreement. To see the nature of the problem, suppose that there are two identical source
countries supplying labor to a single host country. Without much loss of generality, focus
on the symmetric equilibrium when there is no cooperation between any two countries. The
resulting equilibrium is simply the non-cooperative time consistent solution derived above
with all migration levels (temporary and permanent) equally divided across the two source
countries.
A multilateral regime is deﬁned as one where a deviation by H against any source
country invites retaliation in the future from both the source countries. In contrast to
this, in a bilateral regime H can deviate against a single country without being punished by
the other source country. We assume plausibly here that if there is continued cooperation
between H and any source country in stage 2 then it can hire as many new immigrants as it
29likes from this source country.25 The ineﬀectiveness of bilateral agreements is sustaining
cooperation can now be easily established as follows.
In a multilateral regime if the host deviates from a proposed cooperative agreement then
it will do so against both the source countries and will be punished by both of them. Thus,
in this case we can simply bundle the two source countries into one and treat it as a single
entity without aﬀecting any of the results. However, this is exactly the same structure as
already discussed above. We can conclude from this that there are gains from cooperation
which can be realized in a multilateral world.
Now consider self-enforcing agreements in the bilateral regime. A candidate cooperative
solution involves H agreeing to retain M1c
T (M2c
T ) number of stage-1 immigrants from source
country 1 (2) and returning the rest. If there is no deviation against country 1(2) then H
can hire as many workers as it wants from 1(2) in the second stage.26 If H deviates against
1(2) then, as above, it gets no new immigrants from 1(2) is stage 2. A necessary condition
for M1c
T ,M2c





2 ) ≥ W2(M1D
T + M2c
T ,m 2D





2 ) ≥ W2(M1c
T + M2D
T ,m 2D
1 ) ..... (IC2)
where mic
2 ,i=1 ,2 are the number of new immigrants that H decides to hire from country i if
it cooperates with both the source countries; similarly miD
2 are the number of new immigrants
25 If this assumption were imposed in the results derived above then it is simple to see that it will make no
diﬀerence to any of our results.
26 This is slightly diﬀerent from the structure above where the cooperative agreement speciﬁed the number
of new immigrants in stage 2. This was done for pure convenience and the assumption can be easily done
away with without any change in our results. Allowing the host country to have as many immigrants as it
wants in stage 2 if it cooperates is also more realistic due to unanticipated shocks.
30that H gets if it cooperates with i but deviates against the other source country; lastly, MiD
T
is the number of trained immigrants belonging to country i that H decides to retain if it
deviates against the same source country.
Consider the ﬁrst inequality. The left hand side of this is the beneﬁtt oH from
cooperating with both the source countries while the right hand side is the beneﬁtt oi tf r o m
deviating against country 1 alone. For the proposed cooperation to be self-enforcing the
former must be at least as much as the latter, otherwise H will deviate against country 1. The
second inequality is similar and captures the incentive structure of H to cooperate relative




T? To answer this question we note that current migration levels are quite small
relative to the available supply of potential immigrants in the world. That is, if H deviates
against say country 1 alone then it can meet its entire demand for new immigrants in the
next stage from country 2 alone. Hence, set m2D
2 = m1c
2 + m2c
2 . T h a ti s ,n u m b e ro fn e w
immigrants that H can get by cooperating with both the countries can be simply obtained
by cooperating with just country 2. Thus, the threat of future retaliation by country 1 is
ineﬀective in the bilateral world. The immediate outcome of this is that H will always
ﬁnd it optimal, ex post, to deviate against country 1. This implies that the only agreement
that can be sustained between H and country 1 is the simple non-cooperative solution from
which H will have no incentive to deviate. Suppose that this holds in the remainder of our
discussion. Now consider if any cooperation can be sustained between H and country 2.
Note that our discussion above for country 1 was independent of the value of M1c
T . Hence
we can simply repeat the argument above for country 2 also. Hence, H will always ﬁnd it in
31optimal to deviate against country 2 from any proposed cooperative solution. Putting these
results together we get a simple result that in the bilateral regime, the unique self-enforcing
outcome is simply the time consistent solution derived above.27 Thus, coordination among
source countries is necessary (and suﬃcient) to translate the potential gains from cooperation
into reality.28 To conclude the section we summarize this result as follows.
Summarizing: In a bilateral regime the source country will always have an incentive to
deviate from any possible cooperative agreement with any source country. Consequently, in
each bilateral pair the cooperative eﬀort will degenerate to the non-cooperative solution. The
unique self-enforcing outcome is the same as the non-cooperative time consistent solution.29
27 It is important to note here that we are restricting ourselves to only those agreements that are self-
enforcing. This is common in the general literature on cooperation in repeated games. The rationale being
that some cooperation is better than no cooperation (deviation and subsequent punishment). In the context of
our model one possible caveat can arise in the following way. Suppose that in the bilateral regime H agrees to
the most cooperative solution that be implemented in the multilateral regime. Clearly, ex post, H will deviate
against say country 1 as established above. However, having done so it will not ﬁnd it optimal to deviate
against country 2 now. Thus, we may argue that by allowing this strategy can sustain cooperation between
H and country 2. Our motivation in ruling out such strategies or dummy agreements is as follows. Firstly,
a multilateral institution will be required to make transparent to country 2 the agreement between H and
country 1. This is not possible in a strictly bilateral world. Secondly, international negotiations are costly
(transaction costs) and the source country, realizing that H will deviate for sure, does not gain anything.
Hence, it will simply refuse to part of such a strategy to begin with. Thirdly, each source country would
prefer the other source country to be part of the dummy agreement. A simple waiting game will arise where
no source country will have an incentive to relent. Fourthly, in the real world we observe a large number of
source countries supplying labor to a single host country like the US. Simple extension of the results above
suggest that the host country will have to sign dummy agreements with all the source countries except one.
T h i sh a si t so b v i o u sp r o b l e m si nt e r m so fi n f o r m a t i o nﬂows and other problems noted here and is highly
unlikely.
28 The same argument holds for more than two source countries. All that is required is that there be at
least two countries from which the host can potentially meet most of its demand for labor.
29 This issue is not new and has been widely discussed in the literature on multilateralism versus bilateralism.
See, for example, Maggi (1999), p. 208. However, as we have argued, it is particularly important in the context
of migration as it renders bilateral approach highly ineﬀective.
32Figure 1: Summary graph
Section 4: Implications of the results and testable hypotheses
The following discussion brings out the implications of our analysis for the interplay
between social preferences, dynamics of learning and the skill level of immigrants.
The key elements driving our results are captured by the parameters Sp,γ and c. Figure
1 shows how these can be plausibly seen to relate to the skill level of immigrants.
Consider the value of Sp ﬁrst. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the social cost to the
host is decreasing in the skill level of immigrants. One reason for this is that more skilled
immigrants are better able to assimilate into the local culture than less skilled ones, and
impose a smaller net ﬁscal burden. This is captured in the downward sloping graph of Sp.
Similarly, training and skill enhancement are less important for workers with low skill levels
than for those at the high skill end. Hence, we can expect that the surplus from training,
ex ante and ex post, is increasing in the skill level as shown in the graph by w(γ−1)−c and
w(γ − 1), respectively. The region AB then captures the interval of skill levels over which
33temporary migration is optimal ex ante but not time consistent (conditions C1 and C3 hold).
The region to the right of B features permanent migration as the equilibrium outcome when
policies are set unilaterally. This is optimal for the host country, ex ante and ex post. Lastly,
when immigrants have low skill levels (region to the left of A), there is temporary migration
only even without cooperation (section 3.2). This is consistent with existing evidence in
that in most host countries legal permanent migration is largely restricted to immigrants
with high skill levels.30
While a formal empirical investigation of our predictions is beyond the scope of this
paper, we suggest testable hypothesis for future work. Given that there is little enforcement
of cooperative solutions, our results imply that we should be observing migration patterns
implied by the (non-cooperative) time consistent solution. One straightforward implication
of this is that for countries in the interval AB in the previous graph, temporary migration
is used as a conduit for permanent migration and that this is due to the dynamic structure
of learning and a strictly positive social cost (Sp > 0). There is some evidence suggesting
that a substantial number of temporary visa holders are granted permanent residency. For
example, Lowell (2000) argues that over 40% of H-1Bs in early 1990s were converted to
permanent residency in the U.S. and that this is likely to climb to about 50% by 2007.
However, it is diﬃcult to say that this adjustment to permanent status is driven only by the
dynamics of learning. Other factors may be at play. For example, host countries may use
temporary migration as a screening devise to separate high ability from low ability agents
before deciding to grant permanent residency. We leave this as an important issue for future
30 Much of permanent residency granted to unskilled immigrants is based on "family reuniﬁcation" grounds
which is not the focus of this paper. We restrict ourselves here to "economic migration" only.
34research.
Other testable results of the model are the following. Firstly, the model predicts countries
which have higher aversion (social cost) to immigration will have a preference for temporary
over permanent migration over a higher range of skills. We ﬁnd some support to this
from the survey data published by European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia,
2001. That is, EU countries where a majority of citizens agreed more with the idea that
immigrants enrich the cultural life of their country also showed a greater aversion to sending
non-EU legal immigrants back to their home country if they were unemployed (“conditional
repatriation”). The coeﬃcient of correlation was found to be 0.66 and it jumps up to 0.74
if the outlier Denmark is dropped. For more details, see Table B1 in Appendix B.
Secondly, the results suggest that host countries will typically prefer to retain immigrants
in sectors where there are large returns to investment in training. Again there is some casual
evidence that from the US H1-B scheme, employees in software development are more likely
to receive extensions of stay than some other categories where learning is less important.
Lastly, there is signiﬁcant variation in the composition of migration (temporary versus
permanent) across time. For example, in the Lowell (2000) study discussed above, the
adjustment of H-1Bs to permanent status was about 5% in 1972 and has gradually risen to
over 40% currently. Our model suggests that changes in Sp,γ over time could be important
in this context but further work is required to conﬁrm (or reject) this.
35Conclusion
The issue of temporary versus permanent migration is today central to the design of mi-
gration policies. We showed that unilateral migration policies are globally ineﬃcient mainly
because they lead to too much permanent migration and too little temporary migration.
Ak e yr e a s o ni si d e n t i ﬁed to be the time inconsistency of migration policy: in a number
of cases, temporary migration is ex ante optimal but not ex post desirable. We focused
on investments in training by ﬁrms, but the time inconsistency problem could arise due to
any private choices that alter the ex post welfare calculus - e.g. when nationals invest in
relationships with and marry temporary immigrants.
Existing international agreements, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
have failed to improve on unilateral outcomes because they primarily seek to induce host
countries to make commitments to allow entry. Instead, Pareto gains could be realized
through multilateral agreements that enable host countries to commit to repatriation. Iron-
ically, greater openness could come by creating a mechanism to commit to return than
through one that enables commitments to entry.
To make our argument, we made a number of simplifying assumptions. The distinc-
tion between temporary and permanent migration was based only on the associated social
cost and the dynamics of learning by migrants. But there are other important diﬀerences
between the two types of migration. For example, from the host country’s point of view,
temporary presence entails other “turnover” costs such as limiting social integration. From
the source country’s point of view, temporary migration may avert the costs of brain drain,
but it deprives migrants of opportunities for cumulative learning and saving — which could
36have signiﬁcant long-term beneﬁts for source countries. Our analysis can be extended to
incorporate these dimensions.
There could also be other important elements of international cooperation on labor
mobility. The framework of existing trade agreements implies that obligations are assumed
by host countries alone, to provide market access on a non-discriminatory basis regardless of
conditions in source countries. In contrast, the assumption of obligations by source countries
also is a key element of regional trade agreements (e.g. NAFTA and APEC) that have
facilitated mobility of the skilled, and of bilateral labor agreements (e.g. between Spain
and Ecuador) that have to a limited extent improved temporary access for the unskilled.
Source country obligations include pre-movement screening and selection, accepting and
facilitating return, and commitments to combat illegal migration. How these elements can
be incorporated in a more general agreement on migration is the subject of a companion
paper.
37Appendix A
Welfare improvement from cooperation in Case A: The source country is better oﬀ under
cooperation since there is a larger ﬂow of temporary migrants in stage 1 and in stage 2 it gets
to replace εT number of otherwise permanent migrants with γεT temporary ones. On both
these counts its welfare will increase. Now consider the host country. The main point here
is that the higher value of M1 under cooperation does not by itself increase its welfare since
it could do so even unilaterally. The key point here is that private ﬁrms correctly anticipate
that, ex post, the government will not retain more than M∗tc
T − εT = ˆ M∗
T − εT number of
trained migrants as this will trigger a much larger punishment when εT,ε1 are suﬃciently
small. Thus, downward revision in the expectation of ﬁrms about the future of stock of
trained migrants that will be retained implies that each ﬁrm will now train a smaller number
of migrants. As this occurs, the host country’s ex ante welfare will rise (under C3). Also,
t h e r ei ss o m ef u r t h e rg a i ni nf o rt h eh o s tc o u n t r ys i n c ew i t hMtc
1 < ˆ m2 as shown above, W1
is strictly increasing in M1 with MT held constant.
Summarizing, we have shown that a self-sustaining cooperative eﬀort between the two
countries can improve the welfare of the both the countries relative to the time consistent
solution obtained when policies are set unilaterally. We showed that this holds for suﬃciently
small levels of cooperation (small values of ε1,εT). T h ee x a c tm a g n i t u d eo fc o o p e r a t i o nt h a t
is possible will depend on the structure of the model and parameter values.
38Appendix B: Evidence of social cost in EU
Table B1:A c c e p t a n c eo fc i t i z e n so fo t h e rc o u n t r i e so ft h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n ,w h ow i s ht o
settle in the respondent’s country: For year 2000, % of respondents reporting:
Country Accepted without restriction Accepted with restriction Not accepted
Denmark 60 36 1
Sweden 58 35 2
Spain 56 36 1
Italy 54 38 3
Finland 48 44 5
Portugal 41 44 6
Greece 39 52 6
Luxembourg 38 53 6
France 38 51 6
Belgium 38 45 13
Ireland 34 51 5
Netherlands 26 59 11
Germany 26 53 14
UK 25 50 14
Austria 24 52 6
EU 15 39 46 8
The remaining respondents reported "do not know".
Source: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2001.
39Table B2: The presence of people from these minority groups is a cause of insecurity

















EU 15 42 43
The remaining respondents reported "do not know".
Source: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2001.
40Table B3: Sum index ‘restrictive acceptance of immigrants’, by country for 2000
















0 ... maximum acceptance, 1 ... minimum acceptance. A higher index score indicates more
restricted acceptance of immigrants (working immigrants, refugees, EU citizens, etc.).
Source: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2001.
41Table B4: Settler arrivals by major occupation categories in Australia




Tradepersons and related workers 6.2
Advanced Clerical and Service workers 1.2
Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service workers 4.6
Intermediate Production and Transport workers 0.96
Elementary Clerical, Sales and Service workers 1.6
Laborers and related workers 0.76
Not in workforce 43.1
Not in employment 3.7
Not stated 5.6
Total (absolute value) 93,914
Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs, Australia.31
31 The percentage ﬁgures may not add up to 100 due to rounding of decimals.
42Appendix C: Extensions
The results established above were derived under some restrictive conditions and behav-
ioral assumptions. Most of these were utilized to simplify the presentation of the ﬁndings.
We discuss below how some of these can be easily relaxed without altering our main results.
C1:A c t i v es o u r c ec o u n t r yi nC a s eA
In the previous section we showed that Pareto-improving agreements can be sustained in
a self-enforcing way through simple coordination between the two countries. For case A the
analysis was based on the assumption that the initial time consistent equilibrium features the
source country being completely inactive in its emigration policy. This assumption can be
easily done away with while still preserving the basic results as follows. In stage 2 the source
country will have no incentive to limit the ﬂow of new emigrants as these are all temporary
migrants. This implies that equilibrium value of mtc
2 will be given by the same function as
derived in the previous section. This implies that mtc
2 will still be strictly positive provided
that Mtc
T value is unchanged or lower than the one when the source country government
was inactive. Next it is trivial to note that any intervention by the source country can
only lower the value of M1 and hence Mtc
T since it cannot force the host country to increase
its immigration. Thus, the resulting time consistent equilibrium will feature mtc
2 > 0 and
Mtc
T = Mtc
1 ≥ 0. If the previous inequality holds strictly then this is qualitatively the
s a m es i t u a t i o na sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n2a n d ,i fMtc
1 =0then the threat of banning future
migration can sustain cooperation on the part of both the countries in exactly the same way
as discussed in the previous section.
C2: Asymmetric quota rule
43In section 2 we assumed that the quota rule is symmetric across ﬁrms. Our results
are virtually unchanged if an asymmetric rule were used instead. Consider for example an
asymmetric distribution of M1 across ﬁrms. Since capital is fully mobile, ﬁrms with a smaller
number of migrants in stage 1 will experience lower marginal productivity of capital than
others. The freely functioning capital market will reallocate capital until these marginal
productivity are equalized. Given identical CRS technology across ﬁrms, this will happen if
and only if the capital to labor ratio is equalized across ﬁrms. As long as ﬁrms continue to
be price-wage-takes, their behavior is completely determined by the capital-labor ratio and
not their absolute size. Thus, this situation is exactly the same as the symmetric one in
section 2.
Next consider asymmetries in the distribution of permanent (trained) migrants across
ﬁrms. For a meaningful comparison, hold the overall aggregate value of M∗
T ﬁxed. Suppose
there are 2 ﬁrms with each assigned 2 units of trained migrants in the symmetric case. Now
suppose one ﬁrm believes that it will get to retain 3 migrants and other ﬁrm believes that it
will get to retain only 1 migrant. The question is will the favored ﬁrm train 3 migrants and
the other only 1? The answer to this is simple. The average cost of training is independent
of the number of trainees. The marginal beneﬁt as perceived by the ﬁrms is also independent
of the scale of operation since each ﬁrm takes the price as given and perceives the marginal
productivity of labor in the future stage to be same across ﬁrms due to capital mobility.
With the incentive to train migrants independent of the scale of operation of any single ﬁrm,
the stated asymmetry will have no eﬀect on the number of migrants trained in the aggregate.
Lastly, consider asymmetry in the distribution of new stage-2 migrants across diﬀerent
44ﬁrms. The decision to train migrants will not be aﬀected by this for any ﬁrm. The
logic is same as in the previous paragraph. The average (and marginal) cost of training is
independent of stock of new migrants with any ﬁrm. The marginal beneﬁt from training
depends upon the expected future price and expected marginal productivity of the trained
migrant. The former is independent of the ﬁrm-characteristics (since ﬁrms are atomistic)
while the latter will is ﬁxed at the existing rental value of capital32 which each ﬁrm treats
a si n d e p e n d e n to fi t so w ns t r u c t u r e .
C3: Naive expectations
An alternative to the structure of expectations in the previous section is for ﬁrms to
hold naive expectations. For example, we can specify a model where each ﬁrm holds some
arbitrary beliefs about the endogenous variables and then search for the ones which will
be realized ex post. In the context of this paper the main problem with this approaches
that gives rise to self-fulﬁlling multiple equilibria. For example, if each ﬁrm believes that no
migrants will be retained in the future then it will not train any migrants and the expectation
will be realized, ex post. However, if they believe that an arbitrarily small number of
t r a i n e dm i g r a n t sw i l lb er e t a i n e dt h e nt h e yw i l lt r a i ns o m eo ft h e i rm i g r a n t sa n d ,e xp o s t ,
the government will retain them. Our main results are in fact consistent with such multiple
equilibria in the following way. With multiple time consistent equilibria the host country
can be stuck at a sub-optimal one relative to the case when full commitment is feasible. This
is precisely what we will show in our results under the assumed structure of expectations.
32 That is, if the ﬁrm perceives that the marginal productivity of trained migrant is higher due to a smaller
number of new migrants assigned to it then it will also perceive that the marginal productivity of its capital
is lower. Hence, with the rental on capital unchanged, the ﬁrm will lend out some of its capital until this
diﬀerence is completely eliminated.
45Secondly, with multiple equilibria, bilateral agreements can be used to shift the equilibrium
towards more desirable ones. This is exactly what we intend to show. Thus, we believe
that there is not much loss of generality to our results in the structure of expectations that
we have utilized in this model.
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